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  <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/4671" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/4671</id>
  <updated>2025-12-02T13:07:45Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2025-12-02T13:07:45Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>A faceta epistemológica do mito do dado considerada frente ao fundarentismo</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8670" />
    <author>
      <name>Jurkovski, Mateus</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8670</id>
    <updated>2025-08-06T13:54:33Z</updated>
    <published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: A faceta epistemológica do mito do dado considerada frente ao fundarentismo
Author: Jurkovski, Mateus
First advisor: Mendonça, Bruno Ramos
Abstract: This academic work aims to discuss the epistemological facet of the myth of the given in comparison with the foundherentist proposal. To kickstart the discussion, I begin by analyzing the work of Sellars, a philosopher who defended the logical character of epistemic justification in his critique of the myth of the given. Sellars understands that, for epistemology, what matters is propositional knowledge, and propositions relate to each other in a logical manner, an assumption that comes from Wittgenstein's theory of language. Thus, any type of content that does not have a propositional structure cannot fulfill the role of justifying a belief. In arguing so, Sellars disarms a form of 20th-century empiricism and suggests a different form of empiricism (according to McDowell), which accepts the relevance of empirical experience but in a critical manner. At the same time, his philosophy uses the notion of logical space found in Wittgenstein and develops the concept of logical space of reasons, a privileged dimension where epistemic subjects give and ask for reasons to justify beliefs. This concept is based on the assumption of the logical nature of language and reinforces that propositions can only relate to one another to justify beliefs. In the second part of the work, I address Haack's foundherentism, a theory of epistemic justification that, according to her author, resolves the conflict between foundationalism and coherentism by standing as an intermediate position. Some similarities are notable between what Haack suggests and what is found in Sellars' positive proposal, but Haack denies epistemic justification has a logical character. For her, epistemic justification has a dual character, causal and evaluative. The causal aspect aims to preserve the relevance of experience, while the evaluative aspect protects the propositional side of our empirical beliefs. Foundherentism presents a perspective aligned with the principles of ecological psychology in which the epistemic agent interacts directly with their environment. By seeking support from cognitive sciences, this epistemological theory takes a naturalist step that, according to the analysis proposed in this dissertation, avoids the myth of the given.
Publisher: Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul
Type: Dissertação</summary>
    <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Sense-data como universais complexos e a natureza dos objetos mentais</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8542" />
    <author>
      <name>Carvalho, Rafael Luís da Silva Sastre de</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8542</id>
    <updated>2025-04-25T19:24:25Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Sense-data como universais complexos e a natureza dos objetos mentais
Author: Carvalho, Rafael Luís da Silva Sastre de
First advisor: Brzozowski, Jerzy André
Abstract: The terminology sense-data is used in the philosophy of perception to designate objects of which we are directly aware in the perceptual experience, or, as what is “given to us in the senses”. According to the theories that support sense-data, it is possible to justify our beliefs about the external world on the basis of the existence of the phenomenological aspects of these mental objects. However, the intelligibility of the relationship between the subject and the external world is compromised if we accept that the contents of our perceptual experience are reducible to such aspects. It doesn't seem plausible to say, for example, that we are only presented with simple sensible qualities of objects such as colors, shapes, textures, smells, etc., as purist sense-data theorists argue. My aim in this dissertation is to substantiate the thesis of sense-data as complex structured universals proposed by Peter Forrest. In this sense, I argue that to be visually presented with an object is to be aware of a complex relationship between universals. For, if we assume that austere sense-data theories are totally correct, we assume that the complex structure of the physical world is reducible to simple sensible qualities. In other words, we assume that all aspects of the physical world can be explained in simple terms such as color, shape, smell, sound, etc. In this sense, I argue in this dissertation that the structure of the appearances of the physical world occurs by virtue of a relationship between universals that have other universals as parts or constituents. This is why they are called complex structured universals. With this in mind, I intend to articulate recurring notions in recent literature on the philosophy of perception and analytic metaphysics that allow us to justify, from a philosophical perspective, our belief about mental objects as sense-data. To this end, I will first present the sense-data theories and discuss how Moore and Russell formulated their theories. I will then present the three main theoretical strands of contemporary philosophy of perception and raise some objections to them. Afterwards, I will focus on explaining the complex universals presented by David M. Armstrong and how Peter Forrest uses these universals for his theory. Thus, I will dedicate the rest of the project to developing Forrest's thesis, seeking to conclude that some objections do not pose difficulties to sense-data as structured complex universals.
Publisher: Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul
Type: Dissertação</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Intencionalidade e linguagem no animus injuriandi: análise da teoria dos atos de fala nos crimes contra a honra</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8368" />
    <author>
      <name>Zanchet, Eduardo Luís</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8368</id>
    <updated>2025-03-07T18:09:34Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Intencionalidade e linguagem no animus injuriandi: análise da teoria dos atos de fala nos crimes contra a honra
Author: Zanchet, Eduardo Luís
First advisor: Brzozowski, Jerzy André
Abstract: The dissertation aims to analyze the application of speech act theory in honour crimes. This philosophical research started from a legal question: Why do Brazilian courts give different legal treatment to similar facts considered by violators of the honor of others? I found that the main divergence arises from an understanding given about a specific and necessary concept for the configuration of these crimes, the animus calumniandi, diffamandi vel injuriandi. In everyday court life, this element is understood as the internalist intention of the agent to offend the honor of others. The interpretation of animus is what generates greater legal uncertainty in the configuration of crimes against honor. Based on this observation, I sought to analyze the criminal type from another perspective: crime as a violent speech act. Initially, I presented the theory of speech acts and their main peculiarities, analyzed the concept of honor in law and explained the types of crimes against honor provided for in our legal system. Having made due considerations, based on a philosophical exercise, I found that, as the speech act is the product of a dual leveling – Human intentionality and physical level of achievement, what is understood by animus is not simply the internalist element of the agente. It would be better understood as human Intentionality, publicly visible in the act of speech itself. In this way, violent language, in honour crimes, is not limited to conveying the meaning or representing the act itself, but is the performatization of the offense itself, the language is the violence itself. From this philosophical reading on the honour crimes, greater objectivity is established in the verification of violent speech acts and, consequently, greater legal security in jurisdictional activity, since violent language, I sought to demonstrate, is not the representation of mental stage that harbors the crime, but also the violence itself.
Publisher: Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul
Type: Dissertação</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Entre Ser e Tempo: Angústia, Temporalidade e Morte em Martin Heidegger</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8221" />
    <author>
      <name>Fantin, Natan Júlio</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://rd.uffs.edu.br/handle/prefix/8221</id>
    <updated>2025-01-28T16:48:11Z</updated>
    <published>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Entre Ser e Tempo: Angústia, Temporalidade e Morte em Martin Heidegger
Author: Fantin, Natan Júlio
First advisor: Leite, Thiago Soares
Abstract: This dissertation aims to deepen the investigation into the notion of affectivity in Being and Time by Martin Heidegger, focusing on the phenomenon of angst as a fundamental affective disposition that reveals the existential structure of Dasein in its relation to temporality and death, thereby guiding philosophical inquiry. The research is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter explores Heidegger’s concept of death, distinguishing between its improper understanding, rooted in everydayness, and its proper understanding, as the ultimate possibility of Dasein, confronting it with its finitude. This analysis establishes death as a fundamental horizon for understanding existence, suggesting that angst, by unveiling the imminence of death, illuminates the path to a more authentic existence. In the second chapter, the dissertation addresses Heidegger’s notion of temporality, emphasizing the temporal ekstases of future, having-been, and present. The analysis details how temporality shapes Dasein’s experience, demonstrating that angst is deeply rooted in Dasein’s temporal structure. The dissertation argues that angst, by revealing Dasein’s finitude, opens it to its most authentic possibilities and thus to a more authentic existence. The third chapter examines angst as an existential experience that confronts Dasein with nothingness, transcending traditional approaches of psychology and psychoanalysis. The dissertation discusses angst as a force that, by detaching Dasein from its everyday engagements, prepares it for an authentic resolution of its existence. Furthermore, it explores the relationship between angst and transcendence, suggesting that angst, by confronting Dasein with its finitude, plays a central role in the practice of philosophizing. Throughout the dissertation, phenomenology is employed as the primary method of investigation, enabling a rigorous and detailed analysis of angst without reducing it to psychologizing terms. The research concludes that angst, by revealing the temporal and finite structure of Dasein, is fundamental to understanding human existence in Heidegger’s thought. Thus, the dissertation offers a phenomenological interpretation that elucidates the relationship between angst, temporality, and death within the context of philosophical questioning.
Publisher: Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul
Type: Dissertação</summary>
    <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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