A liberdade como condição intransponível para o ser humano segundo Jean-Paul Sartre

Abstract

The present work consists in analyzing the concepts of Freedom, Anguish and Responsibility, as they are approached in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, O Ser e o Nada Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Sartre clarifies the concept of freedom, in the fourth part of his book Being and Nothingness, having, doing and being. Although the issue of freedom is recurrent in all his works, in this part of the book, the philosopher specifically addresses how the primordial condition of action is freedom. It shows that every action of the human being condemns him to be free. Freedom in Sartre is understood as nihilation, it has no essence, hence his critique of determinism. Freedom is not one more characteristic of the human being, it is the human being himself, as the condition of freedom is a property of the human being, it is up to him to make his choices. His action is intentional, thus, makes his choice agonizing, condemning him to be free. The human being has anguish because he needs to choose and doesn't know exactly the best way. Freedom is an inherent condition in the formation of the human being itself, it is something that he cannot refuse and, thus, for Sartre, his action is always intentional. Having, doing and being, is what evidences freedom, placing the for-itself, from an action, which seeks at all times to be an in-itself, because the conscience, when faced with the in-itself or the for itself, it has an intention, that is, this intentionality of consciousness denies other objects in the world and itself, so consciousness will be the nothing that is in the world of the human being. In this way, the human being has the consciousness of freedom. The human being in Sartre is responsible for the choice and all freedom of choice is a choice of something, and thus, the concepts of anguish and responsibility are evident and are linked to freedom.