O problema do conhecimento de entes contingentes em Aristóteles e Duns Scotus

Abstract

This Monograph aims to present the question about the notion of contingency in Aristotle and John Duns Scotus. For this, the first chapter presents Aristotle‟s notion of episteme. From the works Posterior Analytics and Physics II, we highlight the two key aspects that constitute episteme, namely: causality and necessity. We emphasize the distinction proposed by Aristotle between necessary and contingent. For this, the analysis takes Metaphysics V, 5, according to which there are five senses of “necessary”. For the concept of contingent, the object of analysis is Prior Analytics, I, 13. The quarrel of future contingents from On Interpretation 9 is also presented, trying to prove why Aristotle defends a form of determinism. In the second chapter, we present the main aspects of Scotus‟s concept of metaphysics. It shows the reason “being” is said the first object of the human intellect, and the need for its univocity. We proceed to the notion of transcendent and its four classes, namely: being, the convertible attributes, the disjunctives attributes and pure perfections. We pay particular attention to the disjunction finite-infinite. The third chapter introduces the notion of contingency by Scotus. For this, synchronic contingency is distinguished from diachronic contingency and the notion of logical possibility is highlighted. The role of the will for the defense of contingency in the world is emphasized, along with the reasons why Duns Scotus opposes Aristotelian determinism. Finally, we compare the notion of contingent and of episteme by Aristotle and the notion of contingent and of scientia proposed by Duns Scotus, by showing that Scotus‟s theory can better explain the knowledge of contingent beings defending a form of indetermin