O naturalismo biológico de John Searle: uma reavaliação da teoria e de algumas objeções a ela

Abstract

This study aims to develop an analysis of the theory proposed by the American philosopher John Rogers Searle (1932) in Philosophy of Mind, which he calls biological naturalism, as well as to analyze some of the criticisms that were made to the theory of the cited author, in the sense to observe whether or not there is argumentative consistency in such arguments. Still as a goal, this study will seek to develop some thought experiments with a view to reinforcing and clarifying some of the arguments that are central to the theory of biological naturalism. Therefore, the methodology used for the development of this study will be as follows: during the first two parts, the main arguments and conceptual reinterpretations proposed by John Searle will be analyzed, based, fundamentally, on the following works: The Rediscovery of Mind (1992), The Mystery of Consciousness (1997), Consciousness and Language (2002), Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004) and Why Am I Not a Property Dualist (2002). Other of Searle's works about this topic will be used as a complementary bibliography. In the third part of the study, the criticisms made by the following authors to the theory of biological naturalism will be analyzed, in the same order: Paul M. Churchland (1942), present in the work On The Contrary: Critical Essays 1987-1997 (1998), Thomas Nagel (1937), present in his work Other Minds (1995) and Tárik de Athayde Prata, present in his articles Is Searle's Conception About Consciousness Incoherent? (2011) and John Searle's Dualist Character of the Philosophy of Mind (2014). Finally, three thought experiments will be proposed, through which we will seek to clarify and argue in favor of the theory of biological naturalism, as well as a deeper analysis of the notion of causation thought by John Searle