Fundarentismo e o dilema de Sellars

Abstract

The present work presents foundherentism and explores how it, although it is also an experientialist theory of epistemic justification, differs from foundationalism in answering Sellars' dilemma. Considering that foundherentism emerges as a proposal to overcome foundationalism and coherentism through combining the fundamental elements of both theories, we dedicate this work’s first section to discussing their main core and what general problems each theory faces. Up next, we survey Haack’s foundherentism minutely, characterizing in which manner the theory embodies experientialist and holistic elements and answering what evidence’s role is and in which way mutual support between beliefs contributes to justification. Finishing the first chapter, we present the debate’s start of the art concerning the difference between foundherentism and foundationalism. In the second chapter, we address the problem that prevents the success of traditional experientialist foundationalist theories: Sellars' dilemma. In doing that, we characterize what is the “given” according to its philosophical usage, which is Sellars’ dilemma that the foundationalist ought to answer, and why Sellars considers that the foundationalist answer to the dilemma invokes a form of the myth of the given, making it impossible for experience to have an epistemic role in foundationalism. From such preliminary work, it will be possible to examine foundherentism in order to understand the solution that this theory offers to Sellars' challenges. In the final section, we examine a possible objection to the foundherentist solution. More precisely, we show that, despite this critique, we have reasons to think that foundherentism is still successful in integrating experience to epistemic justification.