Platão e Aristóteles: a verdade no horizonte da linguagem e da ontologia

Abstract

This paper is about the notions of truth present on the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. Consequently, it examines how these philosophers conceive the relation between discourse and reality. This work is divided in three parts. First, from the analysis of the dialogue Sophist, the platonic notion of truth is presented, as well as the concepts of discourse and reality. In this dialogue, ontology is observed from the paradigmatic relation of the Five Supreme Genera responsible for the most elementary structure of the reality and discourse. Here, the notion of truth appears from a discussion about the existence of the nonbeing, vetoed by Parmenides of Elea, and the possibility of the false discourse, denied by the sophists. The second chapter discusses the Aristotelian conception of truth, particularly through the books On Interpretation and Metaphysics. At this instant, it is possible to observe that, despite the truth residing in the logos apophantikos, it needs a state of affairs responsible for determining it, i.e., capable of conferring a true value to the enunciated. There is, here, the notion of ontological primacy, a characteristic originated by the inherent need for the enunciative discourse that refers to the temporality of truth. Finally, the third chapter examines the existence of a possible theoretical continuity between Plato and Aristotle. At that chapter, is it observed that, on one hand, the philosophers converge about the notion of truth, but on the other hand, they differ as to the theory of reality. Accordingly, Aristotle, denying the existence of the Theory of Ideas, conceives the discourse from a predicative structure and not through participation, as in Plato.