Motivação e responsabilidade na ética do discurso de Habermas

Abstract

The objective of the text is to analyze the conception of motivation to act and that of responsibility in the actions inherent to Habermas' discourse ethics based on the challenges in relation to his modus operandi(reasoning and applicability). The task lies in identifying the elements of this co-relation (cooriginality) between the rules of discourse and the communicative rationality intrinsic in speech acts in the theory of communicative action and motivational mobiles for the wills agents and the respective responsibilities inherent to actions within the scope of discourse ethics. To meet the requirements of this hypothesis there are two important aspects: the first refers to the rescue of the characteristics of discourse ethics, revisiting Kant and the respective Hegelian objections, in order to outline the bases for the construction of discursive ethics adjusted with the re-reading of the objections. Formalism, universalism, deontologism and cognitivism as fundamental characteristics join proceduralism towards a second moment in which it intends demonstrate the effects of a pragmatic theory of communication in discourse ethics and the realization of the conditions of possibility of understanding. From the theory of speech acts and the logical rules of discursive in its different spheres, it is possible to arrive at the observation that a speech act is an action (and while utterances imply interactions) and in the communicative action the subjects act towards understanding (Verständigung) and the agreement (Einverständnis) as a normative function (since its rational motivation is generated by the strength of the best argument, the good reasons - Gründe). Discourse ethics operates on two levels in relation to issues related to motivation, obligation and responsibility to act: the first sphere conceived as rational/normative starts from the rules of discourse in the theory of communicative action and remains linked to the principles (D) and mainly the normativity of the principle (U); the second sphere is linked to a political base and to the lifeworld but which impacts on moral content, the notion of solidarity and justice, the conception of good and inter-subjective relationships. The second sphere starts with communicative freedom (kommunikative Freiheit) and communicative power (kommunikative Macht) as the basis for presenting content (solidarity and justice) linked to proceduralism and intersubjective relations. The challenge is to find the connection between the normative expectation of the universal validity of the standard and issues the good life that refer to the horizon of the world of life. It is necessary to identify at both levels whether it is possible to consider the motivational force as weak or sufficiently capable to motivate to act and to generate obligations and responsibilities It is necessary to identify at both levels whether it is possible to consider the motivational force as weak or sufficiently capable to motivate to act and to generate obligations and responsibilities.