Nomes próprios ficcionais em Frege e Kripke

Abstract

This work proposes an in-depth investigation into the reference of singular terms in a fictional context, employing the perspectives of Gottlob Frege and Saul Kripke. It aims not only to comprehend how singular terms can reference fictional objects, but also to examine the informative content of the sentences that involve them. This analysis begins by examining Frege's work “On Sense and Reference” (1892), where he developed his concepts of name, sense, and reference. It is highlighted how these concepts were employed to explain why certain sentences about identity are non-trivial and contain a distinct informative content. Next, the analysis presents some problems in Frege's theory, focusing on those originating from his approach to fictional terms, along with a possible solution. In the second chapter, Kripke's criticisms of descriptivism, and by extension, of Frege, are presented. Afterwards, Kripke's thesis about identity through possible words and rigid designators is exposed to explore possibilism as an approach to the problem of fictional terms. This approach presents some difficulties, which are discussed, along with criticisms of Kripke's theses. We conclude the work by evaluating other possible approaches to address the problem of fictional terms in language, weighing the merits and drawbacks of each proposal. This study aims to contribute significantly to the Philosophy of Language by providing a comprehensive and critical analysis of the perspectives of Frege and Kripke, contextualizing the problems about fictional terms, and prompting reflections on possible directions of research in this area.