Wittgenstein: os objetos simples do tractatus logico-philosophicus sob a ótica das investigações filosóficas

Abstract

One of the biggest questions that involve the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the one about the explanation of the link between the logics of our language with the objets of the world nominated by it. Here, we observe Wittgenstein's considerations about this topic that, because of its great relevance inside the ontology of the Tractatus, sustains the conception that the language is provided by one single logic implicit in its structure. In this first moment, observing this structure and understanding the relation name-nominated through the conception of simple objects, figuration and state of things is enlightening to comprehend the denotative link between language and world. Nevertheless, within the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein abandons this project, in a sort of denial that there is a single essence that directs a language analysis that dismembers it until one last atom. Here, his investigation about the language takes amplitude, when it affirms that the language isn't one single logical system, but, on the contrary, an infinity of practices and ways of life; not in the meaning of a name being the object that corresponds to it, but in the sense of an use, an use that consists in the realization of a game that works in the practice of following certain rules. This way, the research in question revolves around the misuse of the conception of simple objects defended in Tractatus, superimposing his new considerations about the theme in its second phase, more specifically in what concerns the logically proper names and the agostinian understandment of language.