O problema da identidade pessoal/eu (personal identity/self) no livro I do Tratado de David Hume: a crítica de Hume à noção de substância mental

Abstract

This work aims to analyze the subject of personal identity/self in Book I of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, with a main focus on his critique of the notion of mental substance. To achieve our objectives, this work is divided into three chapters: (1) In the first chapter, we address the central question of the Treatise, as presented by Hume in the introduction, and connect it to the problem of personal identity/self: Hume's project of the science of human nature; (2) In the second chapter, we relate Hume's discussion of the origin of ideas and associative principles to the concept of the mind as a bundle of perceptions, which is centrally featured in the section on personal identity; (3) In the third chapter, we discuss some key elements of Hume's critique of the idea that perceptions involve some substance and that substance is the foundation of the simple and unchanging self; in other words, Hume's critique of the notion of mental substance. Rejecting the idea of mental substance implies answering the following question: what is the relationship between the mind and perceptions? We explore two possible answers to this question: the first possibility involves an explanation of the nature of the mind distinct from perceptions, resulting in the need for a science of mind based on the notion of mental substance. The second possibility, on the other hand, entails conceiving the mind without presupposing a substance distinct from perceptions. Hume's choice of the second possibility highlights the positive nature of his science of mind, which understands that the relationships between perceptions constitute what we call the mind. Through the principles of association, primarily through the action of causality, our perceptions relate to each other to form the mind. Therefore, to analyze personal identity in terms of the experimental method's critique, the explanation of the self or personal identity must unveil the succession and connection between perceptions as the builder of an imperfect personal identity as a consequence of rejecting the explanation of the self via mental substance.