O problema da negação da liberdade em Sartre: o ser e o nada e o existencialismo é um humanismo

Abstract

The present final paper aims to address the problem of the negation of freedom in the main works Being and Nothingness: Essay on Phenomenological Ontology and Existencialism is a Humanism by Jean-Paul Sartre, reorganizing the concepts present in the text to facilitate its understanding given the extent and complexity of the work. It starts from nothing as the first concept, affirming the possibility of the existence of the being from it, then defines the forms of the being affirmed by the author: being in-itself, for-itself and for-other. Between each of the forms, concepts that are secondary to the existence of that being are also defined, but which are essential for it to exist, namely, existence (which must precede the essence so that the being can be free and responsible for its own acts), the essence (its characteristics, qualities, individual capabilities) for the initself to exist; consciousness (of), consciousness (of) consciousness, so that it exists for itself; and the world and the other so that the other exists. Having defined the forms of being, having it in the world, the concept of temporality and past, present and future is organized, as it is from them that this being will develop; the concept of freedom and responsibility (and how and why it is a burden) that the being has towards himself and towards the world around him is analyzed, and, based on this defined freedom, the concept of in bad faith, which is essential for understanding the final part of this work. It is concluded that it is through an escape from responsibility for their actions permitted by bad faith that the being causes the denial of their own freedom and the freedom of others.