O enativismo de Maturana e Varela: uma análise enativista do problema da relação mente-corpo

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the philosophy of mind, focusing on the enactivist perspective proposed by Maturana and Varela, highlighting its theoretical and practical significance in the current context. Enactivism views cognition as a dynamic and active process that emerges from the interaction between the organism and its environment, rejecting conventional models based on internal representations or simplistic explanations. The study discusses how this perspective challenges traditional theories such as Cartesian dualism, materialism, and functionalism, suggesting a unified understanding of the mind as a materialized and situated entity. The research also examines the implications of enactivism for neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and ethics. In the field of neuroscience, it proposes new ways of understanding mental disorders as outcomes of altered interactions with the environment. In artificial intelligence, it encourages the development of more adaptable and context-sensitive technologies. In ethics, it promotes an ecological perspective that emphasizes the interconnection between humans and their environment. Thus, this paper reinforces the contribution of enactivism to a more comprehensive understanding of mind and cognition.