A ciência dos transcendentes em Scotus: um novo começo da metafísica

Abstract

The present work intends to present a new beginning in the metaphysical theory, the one developed by John Duns Scotus. The Doctor Sutil, in his metaphysical theory, argues in favor of the being as the subject of this science. Nevertheless, for any notion to occupy the position of subject of a science, it must be univocal, just as Aristotle presented. However, the Stagirite himself demonstrated that the notion of being is not univocal, therefore its primary meaning, the substance, must occupy the position of subject of metaphysics. The Doctor Sutil, disagreeing with Aristotle, affirmed the being as a subject of metaphysics, through arguments favorable to the univocity of the being. However, his univocity alone is not enough for him to be the subject of metaphysics. The being also has a double primacy, that of community and that of virtuality. Through this double primacy, the being is considered the proper object of the human intellect. In this sense, Scotus argued in favor of his primacy as an object proper to the intellect and his better qualification for the post of subject of metaphysics. After that, Scotus can then defend the being as a subject of metaphysics. Because to this, metaphysics finds a new beginning, since the being is the first transcendent notion, that is, prior to the categories; also, as Scotus sustains him as a subject of metaphysics, metaphysics, consequently, comes to be understood as the science of the transcendent. Furthermore, this science is now considered an ontology, and no longer an ousiology, because it has as its subject the being and no longer the substance. However, it is known that Scotus was not the first to theorize about transcendent notions. Therefore, Aquinas 'theory will be presented in the first chapter, to serve as a comparison with Scotus transcendent theory.