O lugar e a função do direito entre Habermas e Honneth

Abstract

The present dissertation analyzes the place and function of Law in the philosophical programs of Habermas and Honneth, in order to verify if there is progress or a deficit of critical theory in relation to Law. Habermas accommodates Law in the midst of his theory of communicative action, as a discursive theory of law and morals, where he sees the subjective rights of participation and communication necessary to sustain participatory democratic procedures. Honneth, in his theory of social recognition, defends a so-called relational justice, that is, justice is decentralized and autonomy takes place via a relationship with the other. Justice is not distributive or procedural, but relational. In Honneth's thesis, Law seems to lose relevance, even though it is present in his debate as an intersubjective pattern of recognition, but which is not sufficient on its own, requiring other intersubjective patterns of recognition. Law here has neither the same function nor the same relevance that it has in Habermasian theory, whose role is to present itself as a medium of democratic procedures.