Sense-data como universais complexos e a natureza dos objetos mentais

Abstract

The terminology sense-data is used in the philosophy of perception to designate objects of which we are directly aware in the perceptual experience, or, as what is “given to us in the senses”. According to the theories that support sense-data, it is possible to justify our beliefs about the external world on the basis of the existence of the phenomenological aspects of these mental objects. However, the intelligibility of the relationship between the subject and the external world is compromised if we accept that the contents of our perceptual experience are reducible to such aspects. It doesn't seem plausible to say, for example, that we are only presented with simple sensible qualities of objects such as colors, shapes, textures, smells, etc., as purist sense-data theorists argue. My aim in this dissertation is to substantiate the thesis of sense-data as complex structured universals proposed by Peter Forrest. In this sense, I argue that to be visually presented with an object is to be aware of a complex relationship between universals. For, if we assume that austere sense-data theories are totally correct, we assume that the complex structure of the physical world is reducible to simple sensible qualities. In other words, we assume that all aspects of the physical world can be explained in simple terms such as color, shape, smell, sound, etc. In this sense, I argue in this dissertation that the structure of the appearances of the physical world occurs by virtue of a relationship between universals that have other universals as parts or constituents. This is why they are called complex structured universals. With this in mind, I intend to articulate recurring notions in recent literature on the philosophy of perception and analytic metaphysics that allow us to justify, from a philosophical perspective, our belief about mental objects as sense-data. To this end, I will first present the sense-data theories and discuss how Moore and Russell formulated their theories. I will then present the three main theoretical strands of contemporary philosophy of perception and raise some objections to them. Afterwards, I will focus on explaining the complex universals presented by David M. Armstrong and how Peter Forrest uses these universals for his theory. Thus, I will dedicate the rest of the project to developing Forrest's thesis, seeking to conclude that some objections do not pose difficulties to sense-data as structured complex universals.