A faceta epistemológica do mito do dado considerada frente ao fundarentismo

Abstract

This academic work aims to discuss the epistemological facet of the myth of the given in comparison with the foundherentist proposal. To kickstart the discussion, I begin by analyzing the work of Sellars, a philosopher who defended the logical character of epistemic justification in his critique of the myth of the given. Sellars understands that, for epistemology, what matters is propositional knowledge, and propositions relate to each other in a logical manner, an assumption that comes from Wittgenstein's theory of language. Thus, any type of content that does not have a propositional structure cannot fulfill the role of justifying a belief. In arguing so, Sellars disarms a form of 20th-century empiricism and suggests a different form of empiricism (according to McDowell), which accepts the relevance of empirical experience but in a critical manner. At the same time, his philosophy uses the notion of logical space found in Wittgenstein and develops the concept of logical space of reasons, a privileged dimension where epistemic subjects give and ask for reasons to justify beliefs. This concept is based on the assumption of the logical nature of language and reinforces that propositions can only relate to one another to justify beliefs. In the second part of the work, I address Haack's foundherentism, a theory of epistemic justification that, according to her author, resolves the conflict between foundationalism and coherentism by standing as an intermediate position. Some similarities are notable between what Haack suggests and what is found in Sellars' positive proposal, but Haack denies epistemic justification has a logical character. For her, epistemic justification has a dual character, causal and evaluative. The causal aspect aims to preserve the relevance of experience, while the evaluative aspect protects the propositional side of our empirical beliefs. Foundherentism presents a perspective aligned with the principles of ecological psychology in which the epistemic agent interacts directly with their environment. By seeking support from cognitive sciences, this epistemological theory takes a naturalist step that, according to the analysis proposed in this dissertation, avoids the myth of the given.